On 1 September 2010, the major German weekly news magazine "Der Spiegel" published on its English website an article by business editor Stefan Schultz titled "Military Study Warns of a Potentially Drastic Oil Crisis".
The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:
www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,715138,00.html
Excerpts: "A study by a German military think tank has analyzed how 'peak oil' might change the global economy. The internal draft document – leaked on the Internet – shows for the first time how carefully the German government has considered a potential energy crisis. The term 'peak oil' is used by energy experts to refer to a point in time when global oil reserves pass their zenith and production gradually begins to decline. This would result in a permanent supply crisis [...]. The issue is so politically explosive that it's remarkable when an institution like the Bundeswehr, the German military, uses the term 'peak oil' at all. [...] The study is a product of the Future Analysis department of the Bundeswehr Transformation Center, a think tank tasked with fixing a direction for the German military. The team of authors [...] warns of shifts in the global balance of power, of the formation of new relationships based on interdependency, of a decline in importance of the western industrial nations, of the 'total collapse of the markets' and of serious political and economic crises.
"The study [...] was not meant for publication. The document is said to be in draft stage and to consist solely of scientific opinion, which has not yet been edited by the Defense Ministry and other government bodies. [...] According to the German report, there is 'some probability that peak oil will occur around the year 2010 and that the impact on security is expected to be felt 15 to 30 years later.' The Bundeswehr prediction is consistent with those of well-known scientists who assume global oil production has either already passed its peak or will do so this year. [...] 'In the medium term the global economic system and every market-oriented national economy would collapse.' [...] The Bundeswehr study also raises fears for the survival of democracy itself. Parts of the population could perceive the upheaval triggered by peak oil 'as a general systemic crisis.' This would create 'room for ideological and extremist alternatives to existing forms of government.' Fragmentation of the affected population is likely and could 'in extreme cases lead to open conflict.'" (bold removed)
Showing posts with label natural resources. Show all posts
Showing posts with label natural resources. Show all posts
05 September 2010
23 March 2010
Article: Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism
Elliot Hen-Tov, "Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism" ("The Washington Quarterly", 30 [1], January 2007: pp. 163-79):
www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a918257573
Excerpts: "Iran is in fact undergoing a gradual process of regime change, not moving toward democratization but rather modifying Iran's brand of authoritarianism. It constitutes the beginning of a marked shift from the existing clerical theocracy toward a more conventional authoritarian regime. [...] This transition will therefore see remnant democratic features erode as the evolving regime concentrates power among a small number of key decisionmaking centers. Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the role of the military-security apparatus will be enhanced, as will the regime's dependence on tools of patronage or repression to assert full control. [...] Profound structural problems in Iran's economy will prevent the leadership from implementing the China model – authoritarianism with high economic growth – but Iran's oil-based economy nevertheless provides the regime with sufficient resources to satisfy its supporter base and discourage opposition. [...]
"After years of reformist meddling, [...] the conservatives used antidemocratic measures to recapture municipalities in 2003, the Majlis [parliament] in 2004, and the presidency in 2005. [...] The June 2005 presidential elections bore more resemblance to elections in other semicompetitive authoritarian regimes. Although antidemocratic in nature, the elections did offer an array of choices. [...] The prominent elevation of intelligence and security figures under Ahmadinejad is a product of their increased role during the Khatami years of silencing and intimidating reformist sympathizers. [...] The successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would accelerate a militarization of Iran's regime. [...]
"Even if the regime has recently had to subdue disgruntled youth, demographic trends indicate that the regime might soon not even be required to call on its coercive apparatus. As birth rates began to drop toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, demographic pressure has been easing, with the last of the baby boomers due to enter the labor market by the end of this decade. Subsequently, the labor force growth rate will shrink to 1.7 percent, about half of the rate in 2000 and easily supported by current [economic] growth. Recent evidence of Iran's economic and social order suggests that the regime does not face an imminent popular challenge and certainly has the means to confront any domestic opponents until this demographic reversal is completed."
Elliot Hen-Tov, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, has been advising senior officials at the United Nations on Middle Eastern and European issues since 2006.
www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a918257573
Excerpts: "Iran is in fact undergoing a gradual process of regime change, not moving toward democratization but rather modifying Iran's brand of authoritarianism. It constitutes the beginning of a marked shift from the existing clerical theocracy toward a more conventional authoritarian regime. [...] This transition will therefore see remnant democratic features erode as the evolving regime concentrates power among a small number of key decisionmaking centers. Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the role of the military-security apparatus will be enhanced, as will the regime's dependence on tools of patronage or repression to assert full control. [...] Profound structural problems in Iran's economy will prevent the leadership from implementing the China model – authoritarianism with high economic growth – but Iran's oil-based economy nevertheless provides the regime with sufficient resources to satisfy its supporter base and discourage opposition. [...]
"After years of reformist meddling, [...] the conservatives used antidemocratic measures to recapture municipalities in 2003, the Majlis [parliament] in 2004, and the presidency in 2005. [...] The June 2005 presidential elections bore more resemblance to elections in other semicompetitive authoritarian regimes. Although antidemocratic in nature, the elections did offer an array of choices. [...] The prominent elevation of intelligence and security figures under Ahmadinejad is a product of their increased role during the Khatami years of silencing and intimidating reformist sympathizers. [...] The successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would accelerate a militarization of Iran's regime. [...]
"Even if the regime has recently had to subdue disgruntled youth, demographic trends indicate that the regime might soon not even be required to call on its coercive apparatus. As birth rates began to drop toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, demographic pressure has been easing, with the last of the baby boomers due to enter the labor market by the end of this decade. Subsequently, the labor force growth rate will shrink to 1.7 percent, about half of the rate in 2000 and easily supported by current [economic] growth. Recent evidence of Iran's economic and social order suggests that the regime does not face an imminent popular challenge and certainly has the means to confront any domestic opponents until this demographic reversal is completed."
Elliot Hen-Tov, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, has been advising senior officials at the United Nations on Middle Eastern and European issues since 2006.
17 January 2010
Articles: Does Oil Hinder Democracy?
Here an influential article that studies the impact of countries' natural resource wealth on democracy and democratization processes, claiming that natural resources have "antidemocratic properties" – "oil and mineral wealth tends to make states less democratic": Michael L. Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" ("World Politics", 53 [3], April 2001: pp. 325-61).
From the abstract: "Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this 'oil impedes democracy' claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistently antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism? The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not."
The article can be read free of charge here:
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/doesoil.pdf
Excerpt: "The test also implies that oil and mineral wealth cause greater damage to democracy in poor countries than in rich ones [...]. This pattern is consistent with the observation that large oil discoveries appear to have no discernible antidemocratic effects in advanced industrialized states, such as Norway, Britain, and the U.S., but may harm or destabilize democracy in poorer countries. [...]
"Moreover, [...] a given rise in oil exports will do more harm in oil-poor states than in oil-rich ones. Hence, oil inhibits democracy even when exports are relatively small, particularly in poor states."
On his website, Michael Ross also provides the preliminary draft of a 2009 working paper titled "Oil and Democracy Revisited":
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20and%20Democracy%20Revisited.pdf
Abstract: "Recent studies have disputed the claim that 'oil hinders democracy,' or raised questions about the causal mechanisms behind it. I re-examine this question, using an improved measure of petroleum wealth, and a dataset that covers all countries from 1960 to 2002. I also explore other types of evidence on oil and authoritarian rule, including data on public opinion and gasoline prices. The results suggest a) oil wealth strongly inhibits democratic transitions in authoritarian states; b) oil's anti-democratic effects seem to vary over time and across regions; and c) there is little support for most of the alleged causal mechanisms, including two of the three mechanisms suggested by Ross [2001]."
Excerpt: "[According to the World Values Survey] Oil Income is strongly and negatively correlated with a less favorable view of democracy. The pattern can be seen in [...] the fraction of respondents in each country that agreed, or strongly agreed, with the statement supporting democracy. [...] This pattern holds across regions of the world: in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Former Soviet Union, citizens in oil-rich states have less affection for democracy than citizens in oil-poor states".
This working paper also provides references to the most recent literature in the field.
An article of interest not mentioned by Ross, though, is Kevin M. Morrison, "Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A Best Case Scenario" ("Public Choice", 131 [3-4], June 2007: pp 365-86). Here again a link to the full text:
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/kmm368/bestcase.pdf
Abstract: "Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly (the best-case scenario). The models show that even with institutional safeguards, these resources diminish chances for democratization. In addition to their practical importance, the results have an important theoretical implication: the political resource curse may not be due to dictators' use of these resources, but simply to their existence in nondemocracies."
Michael L. Ross is Professor in the Department of Political Science at UCLA and Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
Kevin M. Morrison is now an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University.
From the abstract: "Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this 'oil impedes democracy' claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistently antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism? The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not."
The article can be read free of charge here:
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/doesoil.pdf
Excerpt: "The test also implies that oil and mineral wealth cause greater damage to democracy in poor countries than in rich ones [...]. This pattern is consistent with the observation that large oil discoveries appear to have no discernible antidemocratic effects in advanced industrialized states, such as Norway, Britain, and the U.S., but may harm or destabilize democracy in poorer countries. [...]
"Moreover, [...] a given rise in oil exports will do more harm in oil-poor states than in oil-rich ones. Hence, oil inhibits democracy even when exports are relatively small, particularly in poor states."
On his website, Michael Ross also provides the preliminary draft of a 2009 working paper titled "Oil and Democracy Revisited":
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/ross/Oil%20and%20Democracy%20Revisited.pdf
Abstract: "Recent studies have disputed the claim that 'oil hinders democracy,' or raised questions about the causal mechanisms behind it. I re-examine this question, using an improved measure of petroleum wealth, and a dataset that covers all countries from 1960 to 2002. I also explore other types of evidence on oil and authoritarian rule, including data on public opinion and gasoline prices. The results suggest a) oil wealth strongly inhibits democratic transitions in authoritarian states; b) oil's anti-democratic effects seem to vary over time and across regions; and c) there is little support for most of the alleged causal mechanisms, including two of the three mechanisms suggested by Ross [2001]."
Excerpt: "[According to the World Values Survey] Oil Income is strongly and negatively correlated with a less favorable view of democracy. The pattern can be seen in [...] the fraction of respondents in each country that agreed, or strongly agreed, with the statement supporting democracy. [...] This pattern holds across regions of the world: in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and the Former Soviet Union, citizens in oil-rich states have less affection for democracy than citizens in oil-poor states".
This working paper also provides references to the most recent literature in the field.
An article of interest not mentioned by Ross, though, is Kevin M. Morrison, "Natural Resources, Aid, and Democratization: A Best Case Scenario" ("Public Choice", 131 [3-4], June 2007: pp 365-86). Here again a link to the full text:
http://falcon.arts.cornell.edu/kmm368/bestcase.pdf
Abstract: "Natural resources and aid give dictators revenue to maintain power. Attempts are being made, therefore, to funnel these resources away from nondemocratic governments and toward their citizens. Using formal analysis and building on existing theories of democratization, I analyze the effects of such institutional solutions when they function perfectly (the best-case scenario). The models show that even with institutional safeguards, these resources diminish chances for democratization. In addition to their practical importance, the results have an important theoretical implication: the political resource curse may not be due to dictators' use of these resources, but simply to their existence in nondemocracies."
Michael L. Ross is Professor in the Department of Political Science at UCLA and Director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies.
Kevin M. Morrison is now an Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Cornell University.
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