Report on the Anti-Democracy Agenda Symposium 2010: Setting the example for the debate of the future

The first event held by the Geneva-based Sussex Centre for the Individual and Society (SCIS) in conjunction with its "Anti-Democracy Agenda" blog, the Anti-Democracy Agenda Symposium 2010, took place to great acclaim on 8 and 9 November 2010 at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich.

Keynotes to the symposium were contributed by Professor Doh Chull Shin, a native of Korea, director of the Korea Democracy Barometer, and core partner in the Asian Barometer Survey (an ongoing research project monitoring democratization in Asian countries), who is based in the Department of Political Science at the University of Missouri, a leading public research university in the United States, and Professor Kuldip Singh, Head of the Department of Political Science at Guru Nanak Dev University in Amritsar, India.

The Anti-Democracy Agenda Symposium 2010 attracted twelve papers submitted by participants from institutions such as the National University of Singapore, the University of the Philippines, the Technical University of Lisbon (Portugal), Ankara University (Turkey), the University of the Punjab, Quaid-i-Azam University (both Pakistan), the University of Central Oklahoma (USA), and the Islamic Azad University (Iran). Other countries and territories of origin or residence represented include Palestine, Hong Kong, New Zealand, the UK, Switzerland, Nigeria, Korea, and India.

Participants – from doctoral candidates to full professors – came from the disciplines of Political Science, Philosophy, Political Theory, Islamic Studies, Defence and Strategic Studies, Law, and Media Studies, giving theoretical as well as empirical presentations under the titles "Is Confucianism Anti-democratic?", "Islamic Philosophy and Criticizing Democracy", "Against Liberal Democracy", "Anti-Democracy Is Created By Means of Media", "Twenty-First Century Anti-Democracy: Theory and Practice in the World", "A Critique of Western Discourses of Sovereignty and Democracy from Chinese Lenses", "Reflecting on Anti-Democracy Forces in Arab Politics", "'Democracy' in Kazakhstan: Political System Managed from Above", "Pakistan’s Road to Democracy: Islam, Military and Silent Majority", "Democracy: A Form of Government or an Instinct?", "The Role of Ethics in Shaping Democracy: An Examination of Unethical Actions among House of Assembly Members in Nigeria", and "Pekan Anti Otoritarian: Some Observations on Anarchist Gathering at Indonesia".

After a workshop on "Anti-Democratic Thought" in Manchester in 2007, this was the second symposium on anti-democracy organized by the Sussex Centre for the Individual and Society and, once more, it opened up new frontiers for the study of anti-democratic thought and practice. Bringing together scholars from both sides of the debate, advocates of democracy as well as critics and opponents, it set the example for the proper academic conduct of a discussion that does not take place anywhere else, yet. Focusing on twenty-first century anti-democracy, rather than historical expressions and criticisms, it shone the way toward the most important debate of the near future. Asia will play as central a role in that debate as participants from Asia did in our symposium.

The Anti-Democracy Agenda blog and the Sussex Centre for the Individual and Society will continue to be at the forefront of these developments.

Book: The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor

Zheng Yongnian, "The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, reproduction and transformation" (Routledge, December 2009):

www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415559652/

Publisher's description: "The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the largest and one of the most powerful, political organizations in the world today, which has played a crucial role in initiating most of the major reforms of the past three decades in China. China's rapid rise has enabled the CCP to extend its influence throughout the globe, but the West remains uncertain whether the CCP will survive China's ongoing socio-economic transformation and become a democratic country [sic]. With rapid socio-economic transformation, the CCP has itself experienced drastic changes. Zheng Yongnian argues that whilst the concept of political party in China was imported, the CCP is a Chinese cultural product: it is an entirely different breed of political party from those in the West – an organizational emperor, wielding its power in a similar way to Chinese emperors of the past. Using social and political theory, this book examines the CCP's transformation in the reform era, and how it is now struggling to maintain the continuing domination of its imperial power. The author argues that the CCP has managed these changes as a proactive player throughout, and that the nature of the CCP implies that as long as the party is transforming itself in accordance to socio-economic changes, the structure of party dominion over the state and society will not be allowed to change."

Review: "Throughout his book, Zheng makes the case that the CCP's approach to power is contingent on historical continuity and draws from practices implemented back when the country was ruled by emperors. Though this argument could be exploited to make a case against democratization, it nevertheless makes a valid contribution to our understanding of the party's resistance to Western-style democracy and the ostensible lack of widespread calls for such democracy among ordinary Chinese. [...] Ironically, as Zheng points out, historical continuity, i.e., the reproduction of the organizational emperorship, is also the main driver behind the CCP's need to adapt and embrace Marxism's nemeses, such as capitalism and democratic elements, as Chinese history is rife with examples of rigid systems being overthrown by a counter-hegemonic force. As such, to avoid a similar fate, the CCP has no choice but to open up, which in turn empowers other social classes that must be kept in check lest they overturn the system. 'As long as the CCP is able to reproduce itself as an organizational emperor,' Zheng concludes, 'it is unlikely that China will develop into a Western style of democracy.'" (J. Michael Cole, "Taipei Times")

Zheng Yongnian is Professor and Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore.

Article: Russia's Machiavellian support for democracy

The Madrid-based "European think tank for global action" Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) has released its latest "Policy Brief", "Russia's Machiavellian support for democracy" (no. 56, October 2010), authored by FRIDE researchers Natalia Shapovalova and Kateryna Zarembo.

The article can be downloaded free of charge here:

www.fride.org/publication/811/russia%27s-machiavellian-support-for-democracy

Excerpts: "Russia has been labelled as an 'autocracy promoter' in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. Colliding with EU and US democracy promotion efforts, Russia has supported anti-democratic regimes among the CIS countries. Yet it is also showing another, curious face as an avid democracy promoter. Russia has contributed to the subversion of pro-Western regimes in Georgia and Ukraine and supported authoritarian Belarus for years. However, Russia does not only show its discontent with democratic leaders. Undemocratic ones do not gain its approval either, if their policies are not in line with Russian interests and demands. [...] Russian policies in the neighbourhood adopt democracy promotion rhetoric when it is deemed effective for geopolitical reasons. [...] This does not mean that Russia is heading towards democratisation; rather, it points to its ability to employ different tactics, from promoting autocracy to supporting democracy [...]. The democratisation agenda can become a pernicious weapon in the hands of an autocracy. [...]

"Russia's democracy promotion toolbox varies, just as Western aid to democracy does. Russia alternately withdraws financial aid; imposes trade sanctions; supports opposition or pro-democracy NGOs; launches a media campaign against authoritarian rulers; and calls for democratic elections. [...] The pattern of Russia's strategy towards its neighbourhood is clear: the West's democratisation discourse and agenda are deployed in order to change leaders that are strong but disloyal to Russia [...]. The Kremlin tries to make sure that competition among domestic leaders is as fierce as possible, thus disuniting the elites and securing an easy grip on power and assets for itself. In addition, Russia is cast in a favourable light by being seen to cooperate with the West [...]. Such democracy promotion by Russia can also be viewed as part of Russia's strategy of redefining the notion of democracy. Both at home and abroad, Russia does not deny the imperative of democracy as such. Rather, it insists on its own interpretation of democracy and selectively criticises the democratic credentials of others, mainly in order to divert external criticism away from itself or to put pressure on unfriendly political regimes."

Albeit a policy brief, the article is sorely lacking in supporting references.

Article: Why western-style democracy is not suitable for Africa

George Ayittey is the author of a commentary article titled "Why western-style democracy is not suitable for Africa", published on 20 August 2010 on the CNN news website.

The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:

http://edition.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/08/20/ayittey.democracy.africa/index.html

Excerpts: "Western-style multi-party democracy is possible but not suitable for Africa. [...] The alternative is to take decisions by consensus. [...] In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the winds of change swept across Africa, toppling long-standing autocrats. In our haste to democratize – and also as a condition for Western aid – we copied and adopted the Western form of democracy and neglected to build upon our own democratic tradition. The Western model allowed an elected leader to use power and the state machinery to advance the economic interests of his ethnic group and exclude all others [...]. Virtually all of Africa's civil wars were started by politically marginalized or excluded groups. At Africa's traditional village level, a chief is chosen by the Queen Mother of the royal family to rule for life. His appointment must be ratified by the Council of Elders, which consists of heads of extended families in the village. In governance, the chief must consult with the Council on all important matters. [...] If the chief and the Council cannot reach unanimous decision on an important issue, a village meeting is called and the issue put before the people, who will debate it until they reach a consensus. [...]

"If the chief is 'bad' he can be recalled by the Queen Mother, removed by the Council of Elders, or abandoned by the people, who will vote with their feet to settle somewhere else. [...] Africans could have built upon this system. In the West, the basic economic and social unit is the individual; in Africa, it is the extended family or the collective. The American says, 'I am because I am.' The African says, 'I am because we are.' The 'we' denotes the community. So let each group choose their leaders and place them in a National Assembly. Next, let each province or state choose their leaders and place them in a National Council. Choose the president from this National Council and avoid the huge expenditures on election campaigning that comes with Western-style democracy. Those resources can be better put to development in poor African countries. Next, let the president and National Council take their decisions by consensus. If there is a deadlock, refer the issue to the National Assembly. This type of democracy is in consonance with our own African heritage."

Ghanaian-born George Ayittey is a Distinguished Economist in Residence at American University, Washington, DC, a Research Fellow at the libertarian Independent Institute, and an Associate Scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). In 2008, the magazines "Prospect" (UK) and "Foreign Policy" (US) listed him as one of the "Top 100 Public Intellectuals".

Article: Asia's Dithering Democracies

On 1 January 2009, "Time" published on its website an article titled "Asia's Dithering Democracies", authored by the magazine's Southeast Asia Bureau Chief, Hannah Beech, who is of Japanese and American parentage.

The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:

www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1869271,00.html

Excerpts: "After the shackles of colonialism were overthrown, largely after World War II, the 21st century was supposed to herald the ascent of democracy in Asia. While parts of the region – from Burma and North Korea to Laos, Vietnam and China – are still governed by diktat, the past couple of decades have created a region that to all outward appearances is largely democratic. [...] Yet throughout 2008, many Asians appeared to progressively lose their faith in democratic politics. [...] In many ways, the challenges of Asian democracy are a reflection of its youth. Democracy in the West evolved over centuries – and, even then, its proponents understood its limitations [....] Asia, for the most part, has raced through the democratization process in just a couple of decades. [...] Growing pains may be forgiven in emerging democracies. But if the current political instabilities are allowed to metastasize, Asian nations could tire of the notion of democracy altogether because it's considered too messy, ineffectual or corrupt.

"In South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Thailand and the Philippines, a study by the governance-tracking Asian Barometer Project found that more citizens believed that the nations' recent democratic transitions had brought no improvement to their lives than those who saw positive changes. With time softening the memories of autocratic rule, nostalgia for overthrown dictators is spreading. Some are even calling for a resurgence of so-called 'Asian values,' a mix of paternalistic discipline and market economics that fell into disregard after the 1997 financial meltdown [...]. In [...] many parts of Asia, members of the educated élite bristle at the notion that Western-style democracy is a one-size-fits-all political system. [...]

"Although the Asian Barometer Project found that the majority of Asians say they support most democratic ideals, their commitment to limits on a leader's power is far lower than that of people polled in Europe or even sub-Saharan Africa. [...] This ruler-knows-best attitude can make Asians act more like subjects than citizens. Militaries – the other power pole in much of Asia – can meddle in politics without much public distress from the masses. [...] When Asians finally do react against their governments, it is often in extremis, anger spilling onto the streets in revolutionary-style rallies. [...] For frustrated farmers or construction workers or street vendors, it may be easier to imagine political change through a groundswell of antigovernment rallies rather than through checking one of many underwhelming candidates on a ballot. [...] The backlash against electoral politics by the very people who were recently its proponents may be the most troubling sign of Asian democracy under siege."

It is not mentioned whether the article appeared in print too.

Article: Toppling democracy

Thongchai Winichakul, "Toppling democracy" ("Journal of Contemporary Asia", 38 [1], February 2008: pp. 11-37).

The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:

www.sameskybooks.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/02/j-of-contem-asia-2008-thongchai-winichakul-toppling-democracy.pdf

Abstract: "Thailand's 2006 royalist coup is best understood by reference to the historical context of democratisation. The dominant historiography of Thai democratisation is either a simplistic liberal view of anti-military democracy or a royalist one that is ultimately anti-democratic. This article offers a serial history of democratisation that allows us to see the long duration of layered historical processes. As democratisation is fundamentally a break from the centralised absolute monarchy, the monarchy and the monarchists, despite their up and down political fortunes, have probably played the most significant role in shaping Thai democracy since 1932. Despite that, their role and place in history has been overlooked due to the perception that they are 'above politics.' This article argues that, since 1973 in particular, the monarchists have assumed the status of the superior realm in Thai politics that claims the high moral ground above politicians and normal politics. With distaste for electoral politics, and in tacit collaboration with the so-called people's sector, activists and intellectuals, they have undermined electoral democracy in the name of 'clean politics' versus the corruption of politicians. The 2006 coup that toppled democracy was the latest effort of the monarchists to take control of the democratisation process."

Excerpts: "The fight against corruption and money politics seems indisputably a good cause. It should contribute to democracy with no harm whatsoever. In the context of Thai democratisation of the past thirty years, however, the repercussions and consequences of clean politics against elected politicians significantly contributed to the coup in 2006. [...] To understand the effects of the discourse of clean politics on democratisation, I shall elaborate its four constitutive discourses and point out how each of them has ramified to become anti-democratic. They are (i) politicians are extremely corrupt; (ii) politicians come to power by vote-buying; (iii) an election does not equal democracy; and (iv) democracy means a moral, ethical rule. [...] If a 'communist threat' was the usual reason for many military coups during the Cold War, corruption has been the usual reason for coups after the end of the communist threat in Thailand since the early 1980s. [...]

"From the 1980s, people have believed that vote-buying is rampant at every level of election. It is considered a political pandemic. [...] Given the distrust of politicians and parliament's assumed lack of legitimacy due to vote-buying, Thailand's democracy has been seriously undermined. The public as well as many intellectuals question the legitimacy of the election as a trustworthy means to democracy. [...] While these public intellectuals may support civic movements or people's power, the supporters of clean politics adopted the rhetoric to undermine the electoral and parliamentary system. During the political crisis in 2006, the royalists and the anti-Thaksin activists alike often called the Thaksin government an 'electocracy' and his rule 'monetocracy.' After the coup, as critics of the coup insisted on electoral legitimacy in democracy, the coup defenders and apologists, including the royalist activists, military leaders and many leading intellectuals, kept repeating that the staging of an election does not equal democracy. [...]

"The distrust of elections in fact goes a long way back and is deeper than the rhetoric above. It is rooted in the nationalistic conservatism that distrusts democracy for being alien to Thai culture which honours hierarchical relations and venerates the monarchy as the highest authority in the land. [...] These conservatives often remind us that a constitution, thereby democracy as well, is merely a Western object. It is not necessarily good for Thai political culture. [...] In 2005 and 2006, the anti-Thaksin movement called for the return of power to the monarchy, arguing that it fits Thai political culture, unlike electoral democracy, which is an alien political system. [...] Not only could politicians and elections not be trusted, but democracy itself is also suspect. This is the ideological basis for the royalist distaste of elections. It is compatible with the anti-electocracy discourse of liberal intellectuals, thanks to their shared distrust of the existing 'democracy.'"

Thongchai Winichakul is Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

CFP: Breakdowns of Democracy Revisited

12th Mediterranean Research Meeting of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute (EUI), Florence and Montecatini Terme, Italy, 6-9 April 2011

Call for papers for Workshop 7: "Breakdowns of Democracy Revisited: Transitions from Liberal-Democratic to Authoritarian Regimes around the Mediterranean Littoral"

www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/RobertSchumanCentre/Research/InternationalTransnationalRelations/MediterraneanProgramme/MRM/MRM2011/Index.aspx

From the workshop description: "Studies of democratization have matured greatly over the last two decades [...]. Nevertheless, early expectations that new democracies would survive and flourish have run up against significant cases in which political reform has quickly stalled out or regressed to liberalized authoritarian rule. This development has opened the door to systematic investigations of the circumstances under which initial liberalization programs have failed to gain momentum, most notably in Tunisia and Jordan. Such studies raise the crucial question of whether democratization can be assumed to move in only one direction. History suggests that liberal democracies on occasion collapse and get replaced by highly illiberal regimes. Classic cases of democratic breakdown include Italy in the early 1920s and Germany a decade later.

"Less fully investigated are parallel instances of democratic collapse in Spain, Greece and Turkey. Completely ignored are countries whose brief liberal-democratic eras have been overlooked by political scientists and historians. A number of important examples of the transition away from liberal democracy can be found in the MENA [Middle East and North Africa region]. Among these stand Egypt, Syria, Iraq and perhaps even Libya, not to mention the aborted transition to illiberal governance in Lebanon of the late 1950s. Focused comparisons between well-studied episodes of the breakdown of liberal political orders along the northern shores of the Mediterranean and largely overlooked instances to the south and east are certain to enhance our understanding of the causal factors and processes that lead democracies to be supplanted by authoritarian regimes.

"Scholarship on the topic has lain virtually dormant since the late 1970s. [...] This workshop proposes not only to bring a wide range of additional, long-overlooked cases into the literature on democratic collapse but also to begin the crucial task of formulating well-structured comparisons across different empirical examples. Contributions which focus on countries that have so far been ignored in the academic literature, particularly ones situated in the MENA region, will be expected to make reference to analyses of better-studied examples. Given the peculiarities of the German model, the organizers anticipate that the experience of Italy during the first two decades of the twentieth century is likely to prove particularly thought-provoking, and would therefore welcome proposals from specialists in Italian history and politics. Contributions intended primarily to advance the theory of liberal-democratic breakdown are certainly encouraged, but will be expected to rest on a firm empirical foundation.

"Liberal experiments in the MENA during the 1920s and 1930s are routinely dismissed as too imperfect to be included in discussions of the structure, workings and transformation of democratic governance. The workshop organizers firmly reject such dismissiveness toward the variety of party-based, electoral systems that one finds throughout the Arab world in the decades before the wave of military-led revolutions washed across the region. Instead, they hope that detailed explorations of the liberal-democratic moment in the MENA, unbiased by what E.P. Thompson might call 'the enormous condescension of posterity,' will offer new insight into the dynamics of politics in this part of the world, while at the same time reinvigoring conceptual debates about the dynamics of democratization on the basis of evidence drawn from all shores of the Mediterranean."

Please find detailed instructions on how to submit a paper proposal for this workshop on the conference website (see particularly full call for papers and online form). The procedures and requirements are uncommonly stringent.

Deadline: 15 July 2010

Only for workshop-related questions, contact directly the workshop directors, Fred Lawson (Mills College, California): lawson@mills.edu
and Abdelwahab Shaker (Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Egypt): abdelwahab.shaker@bibalex.org

Article: Celebrating eleven years of democradura

Abba Gana Shettima's op-ed article "Celebrating eleven years of democradura" was published on 4 June in the Nigerian national daily newspaper "Daily Trust".

The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:

www.news.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19931:celebrating-eleven-years-of-democradura&catid=49:opinion&Itemid=200

Excerpts: "A year after Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999, The Economist [...] narrated, in murky details, the tribulations confronting Africa. These range from natural disasters to the social plague of 'tribalism', and the failure of democracy and leadership, all combining to produce 'shell states'. According to the magazine, 'Democracy does not have much to offer Africa. Democracies are no more stable than dictatorships ... The African ruler finds himself trapped. He wants power and control; but the outside world makes demands about democracy, human rights and good governance [...]'. What the Economist did not contemplate was that Africa, or at least some parts of Africa, such as Nigeria could have the scientific ingenuity to clone their own breed of democracy. Nigeria, 'the giant of Africa' is leading the way in this social and political revolution of the 21st century. The trade mark of the Made in Nigeria Democracy is first and foremost the negation of the very principle of democracy. [...]

"In Nigerian democracy, elections are secondary, if at all important. Elections are conducted simply to mask the political thievery with a moral garment. Since 1999, Nigerian elections at all levels have been a sham. [...] Perhaps, the root of all the election malpractice in the country can be traced to the influence of money in the whole electoral process. Beginning from the level of party primaries to the actual elections, money is the magic that buys and shifts alliances. In Nigeria's cash and carry democracy, everybody has a price – ranging from the electoral officials and security agents to highly placed party delegates and desperate blue-collar political activists and passive voters on the streets. [...] [I]t is deceptive and futile to talk about enforcing due process in the award of contracts and the general conduct of government business when the leaders did not emerge through a due electoral process. How can leaders who emerged through rigging of elections become accountable to the people?

"Nigerian politicians keep telling us that it is all part of the painful 'learning process', and that the nation must endure to 'foster its nascent democracy', as if the country is a perpetual democratic toddler. [...] Now, because the leaders are not accountable to the people, the type of democracy they have succeeded in enforcing on the nation in the last eleven years comes close to what some scholars called democradura or 'hard democracy' – a very hard one for that matter, and habitually gruesome to the core. [...] Even as hundreds of thousands of poor people continue to languish and die in droves, the profligate political class keep stealing and hoarding the resources of the nation like some army of rapacious ants. [...] Do our politicians think that they can continue to subvert democracy to serve their personal interests, and keep hoping that the institution can be maintained? This democracy, the Nigerian democracy, this democradura appears to take so much pleasure in inflicting sufferings on its people. [...] This is why we should not celebrate the so-called 'democracy day', never again [...]."

Abba Gana Shettima is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Maiduguri, Nigeria.

Afghan poll likely to be undemocratic, says EU ambassador

The "Irish Examiner" published today an article by Juno McEnroe titled "Ambassador: Afghan poll likely to be undemocratic":

www.irishexaminer.com/business/ambassador-afghan-poll-likely-to-be-undemocratic-120218.html

Excerpts: "The EU ambassador to Afghanistan has admitted the upcoming parliamentary elections are likely to be undemocratic as a circle of bloody violence continues to cripple the country. Having pumped $75 million (€61m) of EU taxpayers' money [...] into elections in the war-torn nation, [...] EU ambassador Vygaudas Usackas said [...:] 'We wish to have them [the elections] fair and transparent, but it won't be democratic. It won't. I want to be honest with the taxpayers. We won't have the elections we wish to have. Afghanistan has never had a traditional democracy, it has been 30 years in war and they are surrounded by many undemocratic countries in the region. The West, the EU and Americans, we have been exaggerating the expectations in terms of the circumstances we face.'

"About 80% of Afghans are illiterate, according to the EU. Concerns about the September elections include fraudulent or double voting as well as coerced voting, coming on the back of widespread accusations that last year's presidential elections were partially rigged. The ambassador added: '[...] We don't have a voter register. Maybe there's 25, 35 or 40 million voters.' A robust system for voting checks and complaints was needed, he said. EU funding for both elections has included paying for printing, salaries, transportation, training of voting officers as well as security for female candidates."

Article: As democracy unravels at home, the west thuggishly exports it elsewhere

The "Guardian" newspaper on 8 April 2010 published an op-ed piece by Simon Jenkins titled "As democracy unravels at home, the west thuggishly exports it elsewhere". The subtitle or lead reads: "While the US and Britain slide towards oligarchy, the forced elections in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought no good".

The article can be read free of charge here:

www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/apr/08/democracy-iraq-afghanistan-britain-us

Excerpts: "The west's proudest export to the Islamic world this past decade has been democracy. That is, not real democracy, which is too complicated, but elections. They have been exported at the point of a gun and a missile to Iraq and Afghanistan, to 'nation-build' these states and hence 'defeat terror'. When apologists are challenged to show some good resulting from the shambles, they invariably reply: 'It has given Iraqis and Afghans freedom to vote.' [...] Tens of thousands of Iraqis have died and millions been driven from their homes [...]. The import of democracy has so far just inflamed local tension and fuelled fundamentalism. Like precious porcelain, elections were exported without instructions on their care. In the absence of adequate security, they are little more than tribal plebiscites. [...]

"As the joke in Kabul goes, as long as the west pretends to uphold his regime, Karzai must 'pretend to be Swedish'. He is America's exhibit A for world democracy. [...] Democracy in both America and Britain is [...] said to be sliding towards oligarchy, with increasing overtones of autocracy. Money and its power over technology are making elections unfair. The military-industrial complex is as powerful as ever, [...] democracy is not in good shape. How strange to choose this moment to export it, least of all to countries that have never experienced it in their history. The west not only exports the stuff, it does so with massive, thuggish violence, the antithesis of how self-government should mature in any polity. The tortured justification in Iraq and Afghanistan is that elections will somehow sanctify a 'war against terrorism' waged on someone else's soil. The resulting death and destruction have been appalling. Never can an end, however noble, have so failed to justify the means of achieving it. [...]

"A system of government that they [Britons] have spent two centuries evolving and still not perfected is being rammed down the throats of poor and insecure people, who are then hectored for not handling it properly. Why should they? The invasions of their countries was not their choice. They did not ask to be a model for Britain's moral exhibitionism. They did not plead for their villages to be target practice for western special forces. [...] [T]he only certainty for Karzai is that, one day, Nato will get fed up and leave him to his fate, as it is now leaving Maliki in Baghdad. If he wants to live, he must make his peace with Afghans, not Americans, and that means on Afghan terms. Free and fair elections and a stop to corruption will have no part to play in that survival game. Democracy has been greatly oversold."

Sir Simon David Jenkins, a journalist and book author, is the former editor of "The Times" and the "Evening Standard".

Article: The Mechanics of Regime Instability in Latin America

Adam Przeworski, "The Mechanics of Regime Instability in Latin America" ("Journal of Politics in Latin America", 1 [1], 2009: pp. 5-36).

The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:

http://hup.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jpla/article/viewFile/20/20

Abstract: "The paper is narrowly addressed to a single puzzle: How did it happen that countries that attempted to install democracy earlier enjoyed it less frequently? Regime dynamics are driven by two mechanisms: (1) Democracies become more durable as per capita income increases, and (2) Past experiences with democracy destabilize both democracies and autocracies. As a result, countries that experiment with democracy at lower income levels experience more regime instability. Moreover, until they reach some income threshold, at any time such countries are less likely to be democratic than countries that first enter democracy when they have higher incomes. Hence, paradoxically, the resistance of European monarchies against democracy resulted in democracies that were more stable than those following post-independence attempts in Latin America."

Excerpts: "Now, the claim that Latin American countries tried democracy earlier and, most importantly, at lower levels of economic development than Europe and North America is not original, even if it often evokes surprise among ethnocentric North American and Europeans. [...] To some extent, this timing is due to the fact that several parts of Latin America participated in the 1809 election to the Cortes of Cádiz, thus launching the idea of representative institutions at the time when many European countries were involved in the Napoleonic wars and elections were still rare. But a more general reason was that Latin American wars of independence were at the same time directed against monarchical rule, while most European countries experienced a gradual devolution of power from monarchs to parliaments. [...]

"Latin Americans had to constitute their institutions anew. And they were traversing a terra incognita. Monarchies, republics with predominantly hereditary collective governing bodies, and one republic with an elected legislature and an indirectly elected president were the choices known when first Haiti in 1804 and then Venezuela in 1811 proclaimed independence. In several new countries the first form of the government was a collective body that exercised both the legislative and the executive function. Triumvirates governed Argentina from 1811 to 1814 and Venezuela in 1811-12. [...] In the end institutions based on the United States pattern prevailed – in time all Latin American political systems would have elected legislatures while placing executive function in the hands of presidents – but this alternative became complicated from the onset by Bolívar's itch to keep the position for life. [...]

"The most creative was Dr. José Gaspár Rodriguez de Francia who, having become one of two consuls who were to alternate every four months in 1813, then a dictator appointed for three years, in 1816 proclaimed himself El Dictador Perpetuo of Paraguay and ruled it until 1840 as El Supremo. While this story may sound anecdotal, Francia's innovation was both radical and durable, deserving to be placed on par with Lenin's invention of the one-party state. It was radical since the only model of dictatorship known at the time was the Roman one, and in this model dictatorship was a power that was delegated, exceptional, and limited in duration. 'Perpetual Dictator' was an oxymoron. Moreover, the last attempt to make dictatorship permanent, almost twenty centuries earlier, did not bode well for Dr. Francia's fate. Yet this invention turned out to be durable: Francia set the precedent for such illustrious gentlemen as Mussolini, Hitler, Franco, Kim Il-sung, al-Gaddafi, or Castro. [...]

"Now, how is it possible that Latin American countries attempted to institute democracies at lower income levels but ended up with fewer of them at all levels? [...] [A]t a low income [...] level, the probability of democracy falling is quite high. Suppose this democracy falls. The probability that the subsequent autocracy survives is then lower, so that the probability that this country will try democracy again is higher, but the probability that the second democracy survives is also lower. This sequence can be repeated several times, so that if per capita income were constant, both regimes would become increasingly unstable. But income matters: if the economy grows in the meantime, the probability that a democracy dies declines in spite of the past regime instability. And at one time, income passes a threshold above which democracy is impregnable [...].

"Note that the reasons autocratic spells become shorter and democratic spells longer at higher incomes are different. Autocratic spells are shorter almost exclusively because countries that have higher incomes have accumulated more visits to democracy, and such visits destabilize the subsequent autocracies. Democratic spells are longer, however, only because democracy lasts longer at higher income levels. Although past visits to democracy do destabilize subsequent democratic regimes, this effect is small, while the effect of income is powerful."

Polish-born Adam Przeworski is Carroll and Milton Petrie Professor of Politics and (by courtesy) of Economics at New York University.

CONF: Non-Democratic Regimes

Conference on "Non-Democratic Regimes" of the Georg Walter Leitner Program in International and Comparative Political Economy at Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, USA, 11-12 June 2010

www.yale.edu/leitner/NonDemocratic_Regimes.html

Description: "This conference brings together researchers studying the politics of non-democratic regimes, including democratization, repression, growth, and civil and international conflict. More specifically, how do economic conditions affect popular support for a dictator and the transition to democracy? When do citizens protest against a dictatorship and when does a dictatorship respond with repression? When does a dictatorship allow for limited forms of political representation? What explains the post-tenure fate of dictators and how does it affect their propensity to democratize? Is the International Court of Justice a spoiler or promoter of democracy? What explains the variety of non-democratic institutions and how do such institutions affect economic growth? How does the targeting of groups or a populist rhetoric allow the leaders of weak democracies to avoid accountability? Which non-democratic institutions are more likely to generate international wars? Why do the leaders of non-democracies get involved in such long civil wars in the post-World War II period? Presenters use a variety of methodology to tackle such a wide array of questions, including formal and quantitative methods."

Presenters include Charles Boix (Princeton), Joseph Wright (Pennsylvania State University), Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford), Jason Brownlee (University of Texas at Austin), Peter Lorentzen (Berkeley), Alexandre Debs (Yale), Monika Nalepa (University of Notre Dame), Milan Svolik (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Alastair Smith (New York University), Konstantin Sonin (New Economic School, Moscow), Jessica Weeks (Cornell), and Andrea Vindigni (Princeton).

No registration information is provided on the website. To see whether it is possible to participate, please contact the conference organizer, Alexandre Debs (Yale): alexandre.debs@yale.edu

Public lecture: Failure of Democracy in Afghanistan

A session of the Eight Annual Central and Southwest Asia Conference at the University of Montana, University Center Theater, Missoula, USA, 23 April 2010, 1.00-3.00 pm

Public lecture by Farid Younos: "Failure of Democracy in Afghanistan"

http://news.umt.edu/2010/04/041410asia.aspx

Farid Younos is a Lecturer in the Human Development Department at California State University, East Bay, and a TV host and anchorman at California-based Noor TV Afghan Television.

The lecture is open to the public and free of charge.

Younos is also the author of a book titled "Democratic Imperialism: Democratization vs. Islamization" (AuthorHouse, 2008):

www.authorhouse.com/Bookstore/ItemDetail.aspx?bookid=45904

From the publisher's description: "This book poses and clearly answers a compelling question: Are Americans qualified to export or impose their brand of democracy in the Middle East? [...] Farid Younos, as a scholar of not only social sciences, but also the culture of the Middle East, namely Islam, argues that democracy in the land of Islam is not functional. The deeply rooted value system and way of life of Islam calls for a different system, especially when western democracy has its own problems and has failed to bring justice for all at home. Liberal democracy as a secular system negates the role of faith in the political system of the Middle East, and this negation is the main concern for many Muslims worldwide. The question arises as to why the United States of America tries to impose its brand of political system in the Middle East while knowing that it is not a workable idea. Democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq proved to be fatal. [...] This study provides an alternative approach for Muslim countries: an Islamic political system [...] could be an ideal system [...] if Muslims would make an effort to not only meet the needs of their people, but also meet the needs of the international community. The purpose, presumably, of all parties, is peace in the region, and that peace is not possible if Islamic economic, social and political ideas are ignored and replaced by a manifesto of globalization."

Book: Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy

Charles Kurzman, "Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy" (Harvard University Press, December 2008):

www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/KURDEM.html

Publisher's description: "In the decade before World War I, a wave of democratic revolutions swept the globe, consuming more than a quarter of the world's population. Revolution transformed Russia, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mexico, and China. In each case, a
pro-democracy movement unseated a long-standing autocracy with startling speed. The nascent democratic regime held elections, convened parliament, and allowed freedom of the press and freedom of association. But the new governments failed in many instances to uphold the rights and freedoms that they proclaimed. Coups d'état soon undermined the democratic experiments. How do we account for these unexpected democracies, and for their rapid extinction?

"In Democracy Denied, Charles Kurzman proposes that the collective agent most directly responsible for democratization was the emerging class of modern intellectuals, a group that had gained a global identity and a near-messianic sense of mission following the Dreyfus Affair of 1898. Each chapter of Democracy Denied focuses on a single angle of this story, covering all six cases by examining newspaper accounts, memoirs, and government reports. This thoroughly interdisciplinary treatment of the early-twentieth-century upheavals promises to reshape debates about the social origins of democracy, the causes of democratic collapse, the political roles of intellectuals, and the international flow of ideas."

Reviews: "The intellectuals of 1905-1915 were, Kurzman amply shows, deluded about their peoples' readiness for democracy. They were ahead of their time, a misfortune not just their own, but their countries'." (Adam Kirsch, "City Journal")

"This book is a major contribution to the study of democracy in the modern world. While it deals with developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, it will be important for understanding democratization at the beginning of the twenty-first century as well." (John Voll, Georgetown University)

The book is fully searchable on Google Book Search (including table of contents):

http://books.google.com/books?id=HQhsG9v0umsC&printsec=frontcover

Charles Kurzman is Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel-Hill.

Press release: Anti-democratic temptations still present in Latin America and the Caribbean

On 30 March, the Organization of American States (OAS) issued a press release titled "Insulza: 'Anti-democratic Temptations are Still Present in Different Sectors of Our Region'":

www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo=E-098/10

Excerpt: "The Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS), José Miguel Insulza, said today that 'in our continent electoral processes have made remarkable progress, and so democracies have become legitimate in their origin. Nevertheless, institutionality is still fragile and the constitutional changes produced in some countries must prove they can generate stable governments.' The Secretary General's remarks came during a conference organized by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).

"During the conference, entitled 'The Inter-American System: Governance and Democracy,' Insulza said that poverty continues to be the most important though not the sole factor limiting the possibility of reaching democratic stability in the region. He also explained that though democracy progresses in its origin, 'anti-democratic temptations continue to be present in different sectors of our region, especially in two forms: one based on the false premise that whoever has a majority has the right to change the system as he sees fit, and the other one is the tendency of the dominant sectors to distrust the whole process of reform and to make corrections in the most brutal way.'

"In his analysis, Insulza identified lack of freedom of expression, corruption and restrictions to the necessary separation of state powers as 'some of the most important limitations in the transition of regional countries towards democratic stability.' In this context, and in reference to the situation of Honduras, Insulza said that 'if the government of Honduras had requested action by the OAS in a timely way, we could have controlled that conflict before it became a coup d'état. [...']"

Book: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union

Thomas Ambrosio, "Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union" (Ashgate, January 2009):

www.ashgatepublishing.com/default.aspx?page=637&calcTitle=1&title_id=8622&edition_id=11221

Publisher's description: "Authoritarian Russia has adopted five strategies to preserve the Kremlin's political power: insulate, bolster, subvert, redefine and coordinate. Thomas Ambrosio examines each of these in turn, all of which seek to counter or undermine regional democratic trends both at home and throughout the former Soviet Union. Policies such as these are of great concern to the growing literature on how autocratic regimes are becoming more active in their resistance to democracy. Through detailed case studies of each strategy, this book makes significant contributions to our understandings of Russian domestic and foreign policies, democratization theory and the policy challenges associated with democracy promotion."

Contents: The authoritarian backlash against democracy; The external promotion of democracy and authoritarianism; Political trends in the former Soviet Union: an overview; Insulate: shielding Russia from external democracy promotion; Redefine: rhetorical defenses against external criticism; Bolster: Russian support for authoritarianism in Belarus; Subvert: undermining democracy in Georgia and Ukraine; Coordinate: working with others to resist democratization; The Russian 2007–2008 election cycle; The future of democracy and the challenge of authoritarianism

Reviews: "[O]ffers a cutting edge account of active international strategies of authoritarian persistence and survival. Studies of international democracy promotion should take note. Future research will profit by building on the book's analysis well beyond its focus on Putin's Russia." (Peter Burnell, University of Warwick)

"[A] compelling framework for how dictators resist internal and external pressure to expand rights and freedoms for their citizens. Authoritarian Backlash contributes to our understanding of Russia as a consolidated dictatorship, rather than democracy, from its chilling portrayal of the 'Putin Youth' to the ominous signs of a budding partnership with other dictatorships around the world." (Joel M. Ostrow, Benedictine University)

The book is fully searchable on Google Book Search:

http://books.google.com/books?id=ACrNelizytEC&printsec=frontcover

Thomas Ambrosio is Associate Professor in Political Science at North Dakota State University.

The recent Briefing Paper 2/2010 of the German Development Institute, "Russia: Supporting Non-Democratic Tendencies in the Post-Soviet Space?", authored by Antje Kästner, appears to be drawing on Ambrosio's book.

The article can be read free of charge here:

www.die-gdi.de/CMS-Homepage/openwebcms3_e.nsf/(ynDK_contentByKey)/ANES-7ZWGYD/$FILE/BP%202.2010.pdf

From the abstract: "Over the last decade, Russia has not only adopted a more authoritarian form of government, but has also become more active in the former USSR. Russia's growing engagement in its 'near abroad' has been paralleled by the rise of illiberal regimes in the region, a development precipitated by active Russian policy action constraining the rise of Western democracy and reinforced by interests shared by the various governments."

Excerpts: "The Orange Revolution in Ukraine was the key event that led Russian authorities to fear the spread of political unrest into Russian territory. In reaction, the Russian government adopted an overtly critical stance towards Western democracy promotion efforts and began to develop its image as an alternative donor in the region. At the same time, Russia stepped up its efforts to cooperate more closely with authoritarian countries [....] Central Asia's natural resources are vital if Russia's authoritarian form of government is to be maintained, while the promotion of controlled instability in the post-Soviet space strengthens Russia's economic and political influence with the aim of ensuring Russian hegemony in the region. [...] Russia is not only supporting incumbent dictators in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but also reinforcing undemocratic practices in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and trying to prevent democratisation in Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. [...] For many leaders in the 'near abroad', Russia has become an attractive alternative to Western donors, not least because the conditions which the Russian government attaches to its commitment pose less of a threat to the incumbent government's position than democratic conditionality."

Antje Kästner is an Associate Fellow at the German Development Institute.

Article: Democracy at a crossroads

"Democracy at a crossroads" is an unsigned article that was published on 16 March on the website of the South African magazine "Leadership: Interviews, Insights, Intelligence". The subtitle or lead reads: "Globally, democracy has become stale – even corrupt".

The article can be read free of charge here:

http://leadershiponline.co.za/articles/politics/481-democracy-at-a-crossroads

Excerpts: "South Africa is not the only country that has, in recent history, found it difficult, troublesome and at times extremely challenging to make a transition to a democratic dispensation. [...]
[T]housands of Germans, on a cold November day in 1989, came together to pull down a concrete wall that had symbolised the divide between democracy and communism [...]. The jubilation and euphoria soon was replaced by disillusionment and disgust, as organised crime and unscrupulous politicians stepped into the void left by a discredited state-controlled system [...]. There is a growing disenchantment around the globe and the public is fast losing its interest and support for the democratic system. Democracy has become stale, predictable, uninspiring and perhaps – worst of all – corrupted. It is no coincidence that the decay comes less than a generation after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the traditional ideologies of left and right. The drive to assert the superiority and longevity of democracy vis-à-vis the stifling repression of the old communist system has disappeared and has been replaced by a mediocrity that is downright depressing. [...]

"[G]laringly lacking is inspirational and visionary leadership required to generate energy and vitality necessary to rekindle the enthusiasm and will that is already lost, to face the challenges of the 21st century. The excitement and expectations when Barrack [sic] Obama entered the White House [...] have evaporated and the 'Yes, we can' cry has been replaced by a 'Yes, we'll try' whisper. Obama discovered what others before him also experienced; democracy has become a comfortable vehicle for those seeking an easy ride to self-enrichment. [...] Politics has become a very expensive game and fund-raising has become one of the main functions of candidates, leaving the door wide open for big business, interest groups and those with the finances to buy influence. [...] So lucrative and effective has it become that the corporations and big businesses are bankrolling all political parties to cover all possible election outcomes and keep the smaller ones quiet and dependent.

"If left unchallenged, corruption will signal the end of democracy as we know it. In recent years, corruption has embedded itself in the historical as well as the newly established democracies. [...] Small wonder that the public is disillusioned and disheartened. Corrupt politicians and their accomplices unashamedly will exploit and abuse democracy as cover to gain access to the trough where they and their cohorts can guzzle with gay abandon at government tenders, embezzle government funds and gorge on all the other delicatessen served. After all, no one joins politics or a freedom struggle to stay poor. The fruits of victory are there to be picked and devoured, even if it is reserved only for the privileged few to show the masses in a perverted way how it should be done and what could be attained under the banner of democracy. No wonder democracy is under fire."

Article: How Democracy Dies

The US magazine "Newsweek" runs an article in this week's issue titled "How Democracy Dies". Written by Joshua Kurlantzick, the subtitle or lead reads "A global decline in political freedom is partly the fault of the middle class".

The full text of the article (in the browser window alternatively titled "The Global Decline in Democracy") can be read free of charge here:

www.newsweek.com/id/234891

Excerpts: "Many of the same middle-class men and women who once helped push dictators out of power are now seeing just how difficult it can be to establish democracy, and are pining for the days of autocracy. [...] The global economic crisis has also damaged democracy's appeal. To many middle-class men and women in the developing world, the spread of democracy was linked to the spread of capitalism, since many of these countries opened their economies at the same time as they embraced political freedom. As the crisis cuts into people's incomes, many blame democracy, in part, for the economic downturn. [...] The result is that on nearly every continent, democracy is sputtering out. [...]

"[I]n many of the countries where democracy has recently been rolled back, the middle class that once promoted political freedom is now also resorting to extralegal, undemocratic tactics – supposedly to save democracy itself. Middle-class Thai urbanites, for instance, bitterly disappointed by Thaksin's abuses and worried he was empowering the poor at their expense, have rebelled. Rather than challenging Thaksin through the democratic process, such as by bolstering opposition parties or starting their own newspapers, they tore down democracy by shutting down institutions of government and calling for a military coup, even while claiming to support democracy. [...] Many called for a military intervention or some other kind of benign despotism to restore the rule of law and fight corruption, which they claimed had worsened under Thaksin. 'We had to save democracy, even if it meant [ignoring] elections,' said one Thai diplomat sympathetic to the protesters. The Thai elites got what they hoped for: Thaksin is in exile, his opponents are in power, and Thailand's democracy is shattered. [...]

"In Africa, recent coups in Mauritania and Niger were welcomed by the urban middle class, while data from the Asian Barometer surveys, regular polls that examine Asian attitudes toward democracy, show that many respondents have become dissatisfied with their democratic systems. [...] Such is the case in Russia as well, where Putin, even as he wipes out most of the democratic institutions, enjoys staggeringly high poll numbers from the middle class and other segments of the population. [...] Even in China, where it is the poor in rural areas who now take the lead in protests, the urban middle class appears comfortable with the ruling regime. [...]

"The middle class's push back against democracy, by way of coups and other antidemocratic means, has disenfranchised the poor, sparking still more protests. In Thailand, crowds of protesters, most of them poor, have launched their own violent demonstrations that target the middle classes who tried to push Thaksin out of office. Similarly in Bolivia, the middle-class anti-Morales protesters now have been met with angry pro-Morales protesters mostly drawn from the ranks of the poor. In the Philippines, poor men and women furious that their hero Estrada had been forced out by the middle class launched their own counter-protests. Now, with the nation heading to another election, Estrada, out of jail and running again, is picking up support from the poor for his presidential bid."

Joshua Kurlantzick is a journalist and author, a Fellow at the University of Southern California's Center on Public Diplomacy, and a Fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Book: Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa

Dambisa Moyo, "Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa", with a foreword by Harvard professor Niall Ferguson (Allan Lane/Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009):

http://us.macmillan.com/Book.aspx?isbn=9780374139568

From the publisher's description: "In the past fifty years, more than $1 trillion in development-related aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa. Has this assistance improved the lives of Africans? No. In fact, across the continent, the recipients of this aid are not better off as a result of it, but worse – much worse. In Dead Aid, Dambisa Moyo [...] illuminates the way in which overreliance on aid has trapped developing nations in a vicious circle of aid dependency, corruption, market distortion, and further poverty [...]. Dead Aid is an unsettling yet optimistic work, a powerful challenge to the assumptions and arguments that support a profoundly misguided development policy in Africa. And it is a clarion call to a new, more hopeful vision of how to address the desperate poverty that plagues millions."

Excerpts: "Alongside [the aid requirement of good] governance emerged the West's growing obsession with democracy for the developing world. The installation of democracy was the donor's final refuge; the last-ditch attempt to show that aid interventions could work, would work, if only the political conditions were right. [...] For the West, the process of open and fair elections had taken centuries to evolve, but the hope was that (coupled with aid) shoe-horning democracy into underdeveloped nations would guarantee that African countries would see a sudden change in their economic and political fortunes. Yet [...] any improvements in Africa's economic profile have been largely achieved in spite of (nominal) democracy, not because of it. [...]

"In a perfect world, what poor countries at the lowest rungs of economic development need is not a multi-party democracy, but in fact a decisive benevolent dictator to push through the reforms required to get the economy moving [...]. One only has to look to the history of Asian economies (China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) to see how this is borne out. And even beyond Asia, Pinochet's Chile and Fujimori's Peru are examples of economic success in lands bereft of democracy. [...] What is clear is that democracy is not the prerequisite for economic growth that aid proponents maintain. On the contrary, it is economic growth that is a prerequisite for democracy; and the one thing economic growth does not need is aid. [...]

"[L]ike it or not, the Chinese are coming. And it is in Africa that their campaign for global dominance will be solidified. [...] Whether or not Chinese domination is in the interest of the average African today is irrelevant. [...] [I]n the immediate term a woman in rural Dongo cares less about the risk to her democratic freedom in forty years' time than about putting food on her table tonight. [...] The secret of China's success is that its foray into Africa is all business."

Zambian-born Dambisa Moyo, a former consultant for the World Bank and Head of Economic Research and Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa at Goldman Sachs, holds a PhD in Economics from Oxford.

Book: The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo

John F. Clark, "The Failure of Democracy in the Republic of Congo" (Lynne Rienner, 2008):

www.rienner.com/title/The_Failure_of_Democracy_in_the_Republic_of_Congo

Publisher's description: "Why did the democratic experiment launched in the Republic of Congo in 1991 fail so dramatically in 1997? Why has it not been seriously resumed since then? In tackling these complex questions, John Clark provides a thorough analysis of more than fifteen years of Congolese politics. Clark explores a series of logical hypotheses regarding why democracy failed to take root in Congo, moving from political culture to economic performance, ethnoregional identities, French foreign policy, the role of militias, and institutional design. He also discusses the country's present 'electoral authoritarian' regime. His conclusions shed light not only on the nature of Congolese politics, but also on the utility of the scientific approach to understanding the social world."

Reviews: "Clark has provided us with a sure-footed account of Congolese politics, a carefully considered discussion of the most important factors determining the failure of Congolese democratization efforts, a perceptive critique of the ways that the complexities of such processes elude current scholarship on democratization, and a useful guidepost to promising directions of future research." (Nelson Kasfir, "Perspectives on Politics")

"Clark provides one of the most detailed and theoretically informed accounts of recent Congolese politics of any that can be found. He also brings a welcome new realism to the study of democracy." (William S. Reno, Northwestern University)

"This valuable study not only chronicles one of the most interesting examples of 'democratic failure' in Africa, but also provides insight into the politics of one of the less well known, but strategically important, African states." (Victor T. Le Vine, Washington University in St. Louis)

John F. Clark is Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University.