In a blog article by the conservative eurosceptic UK Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and lead writer of the "Daily Telegraph", Daniel Hannan, published on 1 October 2010 on the website of the newspaper, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, is cited as being critical of democracy ("The EU is an antidote to democratic governments, argues President Barroso", so the title of the article). Unfortunately, the quote and sentiments attributed to Barroso are not referenced by the author.
The full text of the article can be read free of charge here:
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danielhannan/100056661/the-eu-is-an-antidote-to-democratic-governments-argues-president-barroso/
Excerpts: "Barroso [...] has offered one of the few utterly honest arguments for European integration. The reason we need the EU, he suggests, is precisely because it's not democratic. Left to themselves, elected governments might do all sorts of things simply to humour their voters: 'Governments are not always right. If governments were always right we would not have the situation that we have today. Decisions taken by the most democratic institutions in the world are very often wrong.' This was, in large measure, the original rationale for European unification. The founding fathers had come through the Second World War with – perhaps understandably – a jaded view of democracy. They fretted that, left to themselves, electorates might fall for demagogues. So they deliberately designed a system in which supreme power was wielded by appointed Commissioners who didn't need to worry about public opinion. It would be going too far to describe the Euro-patriarchs as anti-democratic: Robert Schuman had a sincere commitment to the ballot box, even if Jean Monnet hadn't. But it is fair to say that they believed that the democratic process sometimes needed to be guided, tempered, constrained.
"There are still plenty of people who think this way. Whenever I make the case for referendums, someone in the audience objects that the issues are too difficult for the man in the street, that the experts should be allowed to get on, that we are quietly relieved when politicians do what they think is best for us. [...] Most Barrosistas want a kind of moderated democracy, where voters are ultimately in charge, but where experts also have their place. Yet this has been the argument of every tyrant in history: Bonaparte, Mussolini, Salazar, Lenin. It is, mutatis mutandis, the justification of the ayatollahs in Teheran, who allow elections, but empower an unelected commission to step in when people get the result wrong. It is the argument you hear in private from Chinese Communists: yes, people should be free to elect candidates for certain offices, but a country like this would fall apart without the expertise concentrated in our party. [...] Voters, being human, can make mistakes. But it doesn't follow that a class of experts would have made a better decision." (italics removed)
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iran. Show all posts
04 October 2010
10 April 2010
Book: Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy
Charles Kurzman, "Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy" (Harvard University Press, December 2008):
www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/KURDEM.html
Publisher's description: "In the decade before World War I, a wave of democratic revolutions swept the globe, consuming more than a quarter of the world's population. Revolution transformed Russia, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mexico, and China. In each case, a
pro-democracy movement unseated a long-standing autocracy with startling speed. The nascent democratic regime held elections, convened parliament, and allowed freedom of the press and freedom of association. But the new governments failed in many instances to uphold the rights and freedoms that they proclaimed. Coups d'état soon undermined the democratic experiments. How do we account for these unexpected democracies, and for their rapid extinction?
"In Democracy Denied, Charles Kurzman proposes that the collective agent most directly responsible for democratization was the emerging class of modern intellectuals, a group that had gained a global identity and a near-messianic sense of mission following the Dreyfus Affair of 1898. Each chapter of Democracy Denied focuses on a single angle of this story, covering all six cases by examining newspaper accounts, memoirs, and government reports. This thoroughly interdisciplinary treatment of the early-twentieth-century upheavals promises to reshape debates about the social origins of democracy, the causes of democratic collapse, the political roles of intellectuals, and the international flow of ideas."
Reviews: "The intellectuals of 1905-1915 were, Kurzman amply shows, deluded about their peoples' readiness for democracy. They were ahead of their time, a misfortune not just their own, but their countries'." (Adam Kirsch, "City Journal")
"This book is a major contribution to the study of democracy in the modern world. While it deals with developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, it will be important for understanding democratization at the beginning of the twenty-first century as well." (John Voll, Georgetown University)
The book is fully searchable on Google Book Search (including table of contents):
http://books.google.com/books?id=HQhsG9v0umsC&printsec=frontcover
Charles Kurzman is Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel-Hill.
www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog/KURDEM.html
Publisher's description: "In the decade before World War I, a wave of democratic revolutions swept the globe, consuming more than a quarter of the world's population. Revolution transformed Russia, Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, Mexico, and China. In each case, a
pro-democracy movement unseated a long-standing autocracy with startling speed. The nascent democratic regime held elections, convened parliament, and allowed freedom of the press and freedom of association. But the new governments failed in many instances to uphold the rights and freedoms that they proclaimed. Coups d'état soon undermined the democratic experiments. How do we account for these unexpected democracies, and for their rapid extinction?
"In Democracy Denied, Charles Kurzman proposes that the collective agent most directly responsible for democratization was the emerging class of modern intellectuals, a group that had gained a global identity and a near-messianic sense of mission following the Dreyfus Affair of 1898. Each chapter of Democracy Denied focuses on a single angle of this story, covering all six cases by examining newspaper accounts, memoirs, and government reports. This thoroughly interdisciplinary treatment of the early-twentieth-century upheavals promises to reshape debates about the social origins of democracy, the causes of democratic collapse, the political roles of intellectuals, and the international flow of ideas."
Reviews: "The intellectuals of 1905-1915 were, Kurzman amply shows, deluded about their peoples' readiness for democracy. They were ahead of their time, a misfortune not just their own, but their countries'." (Adam Kirsch, "City Journal")
"This book is a major contribution to the study of democracy in the modern world. While it deals with developments at the beginning of the twentieth century, it will be important for understanding democratization at the beginning of the twenty-first century as well." (John Voll, Georgetown University)
The book is fully searchable on Google Book Search (including table of contents):
http://books.google.com/books?id=HQhsG9v0umsC&printsec=frontcover
Charles Kurzman is Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel-Hill.
23 March 2010
Article: Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism
Elliot Hen-Tov, "Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism" ("The Washington Quarterly", 30 [1], January 2007: pp. 163-79):
www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a918257573
Excerpts: "Iran is in fact undergoing a gradual process of regime change, not moving toward democratization but rather modifying Iran's brand of authoritarianism. It constitutes the beginning of a marked shift from the existing clerical theocracy toward a more conventional authoritarian regime. [...] This transition will therefore see remnant democratic features erode as the evolving regime concentrates power among a small number of key decisionmaking centers. Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the role of the military-security apparatus will be enhanced, as will the regime's dependence on tools of patronage or repression to assert full control. [...] Profound structural problems in Iran's economy will prevent the leadership from implementing the China model – authoritarianism with high economic growth – but Iran's oil-based economy nevertheless provides the regime with sufficient resources to satisfy its supporter base and discourage opposition. [...]
"After years of reformist meddling, [...] the conservatives used antidemocratic measures to recapture municipalities in 2003, the Majlis [parliament] in 2004, and the presidency in 2005. [...] The June 2005 presidential elections bore more resemblance to elections in other semicompetitive authoritarian regimes. Although antidemocratic in nature, the elections did offer an array of choices. [...] The prominent elevation of intelligence and security figures under Ahmadinejad is a product of their increased role during the Khatami years of silencing and intimidating reformist sympathizers. [...] The successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would accelerate a militarization of Iran's regime. [...]
"Even if the regime has recently had to subdue disgruntled youth, demographic trends indicate that the regime might soon not even be required to call on its coercive apparatus. As birth rates began to drop toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, demographic pressure has been easing, with the last of the baby boomers due to enter the labor market by the end of this decade. Subsequently, the labor force growth rate will shrink to 1.7 percent, about half of the rate in 2000 and easily supported by current [economic] growth. Recent evidence of Iran's economic and social order suggests that the regime does not face an imminent popular challenge and certainly has the means to confront any domestic opponents until this demographic reversal is completed."
Elliot Hen-Tov, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, has been advising senior officials at the United Nations on Middle Eastern and European issues since 2006.
www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~db=all~content=a918257573
Excerpts: "Iran is in fact undergoing a gradual process of regime change, not moving toward democratization but rather modifying Iran's brand of authoritarianism. It constitutes the beginning of a marked shift from the existing clerical theocracy toward a more conventional authoritarian regime. [...] This transition will therefore see remnant democratic features erode as the evolving regime concentrates power among a small number of key decisionmaking centers. Similar to other authoritarian regimes, the role of the military-security apparatus will be enhanced, as will the regime's dependence on tools of patronage or repression to assert full control. [...] Profound structural problems in Iran's economy will prevent the leadership from implementing the China model – authoritarianism with high economic growth – but Iran's oil-based economy nevertheless provides the regime with sufficient resources to satisfy its supporter base and discourage opposition. [...]
"After years of reformist meddling, [...] the conservatives used antidemocratic measures to recapture municipalities in 2003, the Majlis [parliament] in 2004, and the presidency in 2005. [...] The June 2005 presidential elections bore more resemblance to elections in other semicompetitive authoritarian regimes. Although antidemocratic in nature, the elections did offer an array of choices. [...] The prominent elevation of intelligence and security figures under Ahmadinejad is a product of their increased role during the Khatami years of silencing and intimidating reformist sympathizers. [...] The successful acquisition of nuclear weapons would accelerate a militarization of Iran's regime. [...]
"Even if the regime has recently had to subdue disgruntled youth, demographic trends indicate that the regime might soon not even be required to call on its coercive apparatus. As birth rates began to drop toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, demographic pressure has been easing, with the last of the baby boomers due to enter the labor market by the end of this decade. Subsequently, the labor force growth rate will shrink to 1.7 percent, about half of the rate in 2000 and easily supported by current [economic] growth. Recent evidence of Iran's economic and social order suggests that the regime does not face an imminent popular challenge and certainly has the means to confront any domestic opponents until this demographic reversal is completed."
Elliot Hen-Tov, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton, has been advising senior officials at the United Nations on Middle Eastern and European issues since 2006.
23 February 2010
Trend: Why China, and others, stubbornly defend "rogue" nations
On 17 February 2010, the German newspaper "Die Welt" published an article by a member of its staff, Clemens Wergin, titled "Deshalb unterstützt China die Schurkenstaaten". The article has since been translated into English by Stephanie Martin – rather freely, if the title she chose, "Why China, and Others, Stubbornly Defend Rogue Nations", is anything to go by – and can be read here:
http://worldmeets.us/diewelt000037.shtml
Excerpts: "Since Russia has now swung around to the view of the Western states on the Iran nuclear dispute, Peking (Beijing) alone is preventing new sanctions. [...] China is acting out of solidarity with a fellow authoritarian regime. This last point is often overlooked in the foreign policy debate, because the West sees China as a country whose political evolution has been delayed, but nonetheless, one that will eventually arrive at the port of democracy. In fact, the conflict between liberal democracy and authoritarian government has been going on since the French and American Revolutions. It entered a new phase in the 1990s and no longer has the ideological focus it had during the Cold War, since neither Russia nor China offer the world a real political alternative. However, they and many others see themselves in a defensive struggle against democracy.
"And in that struggle, every state that remains in the authoritarian camp becomes an important ally. [...] When Woodrow Wilson entered World War I against Germany, he hoped to 'make the world safe for democracy.' Today, authoritarian regimes hope to make the world safe for undemocratic states. After a wave of democratization swept the globe during the 1990s, they have organized a tenacious resistance. They learn from one another. And they stand united. In the end, it's irrelevant whether Iran is a theocracy and that North Korea preaches stone-age era communism. Of importance to Beijing is that both are part of an anti-democratic bulwark, with which the wave of democratization can be stopped."
http://worldmeets.us/diewelt000037.shtml
Excerpts: "Since Russia has now swung around to the view of the Western states on the Iran nuclear dispute, Peking (Beijing) alone is preventing new sanctions. [...] China is acting out of solidarity with a fellow authoritarian regime. This last point is often overlooked in the foreign policy debate, because the West sees China as a country whose political evolution has been delayed, but nonetheless, one that will eventually arrive at the port of democracy. In fact, the conflict between liberal democracy and authoritarian government has been going on since the French and American Revolutions. It entered a new phase in the 1990s and no longer has the ideological focus it had during the Cold War, since neither Russia nor China offer the world a real political alternative. However, they and many others see themselves in a defensive struggle against democracy.
"And in that struggle, every state that remains in the authoritarian camp becomes an important ally. [...] When Woodrow Wilson entered World War I against Germany, he hoped to 'make the world safe for democracy.' Today, authoritarian regimes hope to make the world safe for undemocratic states. After a wave of democratization swept the globe during the 1990s, they have organized a tenacious resistance. They learn from one another. And they stand united. In the end, it's irrelevant whether Iran is a theocracy and that North Korea preaches stone-age era communism. Of importance to Beijing is that both are part of an anti-democratic bulwark, with which the wave of democratization can be stopped."
03 February 2010
Report: Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians
"Undermining Democracy: 21st Century Authoritarians" is a report that was published in June 2009 by Freedom House, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Asia – all of them US-funded advocacy bodies set up to promote democracy around the world.
The full report can be read free of charge here:
www.underminingdemocracy.org/files/UnderminingDemocracy_Full.pdf
Like all bad reporting, it is very tendentious, in particular demonstrating precisely the one-sidedness of which it accuses the media in authoritarian nations.
Some excerpts: "Russia is advancing a new form of authoritarianism, with methods of control that are significantly more sophisticated than the classic totalitarian techniques of the Soviet Union. [...] China, like Russia, has modernized and adapted its authoritarianism, forging a system that combines impressive economic development with an equally impressive apparatus of political control. [...] [T]he[se] systems [as well as those of Iran, Venezuela, and Pakistan] are poorly understood in comparison with the communist regimes and military juntas of the Cold War era. As a result, policymakers do not appear to appreciate the dangers these 21st-century authoritarian models pose to democracy and rule of law around the world. [...]
"The authoritarians examined in this study are pursuing a comprehensive set of illiberal policies that are contesting democracy in practical terms, as well as in the broader battle of ideas. Increasingly sophisticated and backed by considerable resources, these efforts are challenging assumptions about the inevitability of democratic development. [...] Modern authoritarian governments are integrated into the global economy and participate in many of the world's established financial and political institutions. And while they tolerate little pluralism at home, they often call for a 'multipolar' world in which their respective ideologies can coexist peacefully with others. [...]
"[A]s Beijing grows more aggressive in its promotion of the antidemocratic China model, it risks becoming the mirror image of the Western powers it criticizes; it will be 'intervening' in other countries' internal affairs, but to squelch rather than to promote democracy. [...] The elected government that succeeded Musharraf sought to bolster Parliament as the supreme source of power and legitimacy, but it is far from certain that Pakistan will be able to break free of the antidemocratic inertia that permeates large parts of the polity and even the media. [...] Russian efforts have come amid an ascendant antidemocratic zeitgeist in much of the developing world; Russia's role in this trend is as much follower as leader. [...]
"Using social spending as a foreign policy tool has allowed Chávez to win two types of international allies: other states, which are loath to cross him if they benefit from his [oil] largesse, and intellectuals on the left, especially in Europe, who feel that the aid empowers the poor more than the elites. Behind this shield of open or tacit international supporters, the regime is able to pursue its more belligerent and antidemocratic policies with minimal criticism."
The full report can be read free of charge here:
www.underminingdemocracy.org/files/UnderminingDemocracy_Full.pdf
Like all bad reporting, it is very tendentious, in particular demonstrating precisely the one-sidedness of which it accuses the media in authoritarian nations.
Some excerpts: "Russia is advancing a new form of authoritarianism, with methods of control that are significantly more sophisticated than the classic totalitarian techniques of the Soviet Union. [...] China, like Russia, has modernized and adapted its authoritarianism, forging a system that combines impressive economic development with an equally impressive apparatus of political control. [...] [T]he[se] systems [as well as those of Iran, Venezuela, and Pakistan] are poorly understood in comparison with the communist regimes and military juntas of the Cold War era. As a result, policymakers do not appear to appreciate the dangers these 21st-century authoritarian models pose to democracy and rule of law around the world. [...]
"The authoritarians examined in this study are pursuing a comprehensive set of illiberal policies that are contesting democracy in practical terms, as well as in the broader battle of ideas. Increasingly sophisticated and backed by considerable resources, these efforts are challenging assumptions about the inevitability of democratic development. [...] Modern authoritarian governments are integrated into the global economy and participate in many of the world's established financial and political institutions. And while they tolerate little pluralism at home, they often call for a 'multipolar' world in which their respective ideologies can coexist peacefully with others. [...]
"[A]s Beijing grows more aggressive in its promotion of the antidemocratic China model, it risks becoming the mirror image of the Western powers it criticizes; it will be 'intervening' in other countries' internal affairs, but to squelch rather than to promote democracy. [...] The elected government that succeeded Musharraf sought to bolster Parliament as the supreme source of power and legitimacy, but it is far from certain that Pakistan will be able to break free of the antidemocratic inertia that permeates large parts of the polity and even the media. [...] Russian efforts have come amid an ascendant antidemocratic zeitgeist in much of the developing world; Russia's role in this trend is as much follower as leader. [...]
"Using social spending as a foreign policy tool has allowed Chávez to win two types of international allies: other states, which are loath to cross him if they benefit from his [oil] largesse, and intellectuals on the left, especially in Europe, who feel that the aid empowers the poor more than the elites. Behind this shield of open or tacit international supporters, the regime is able to pursue its more belligerent and antidemocratic policies with minimal criticism."
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